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Abstract
Political lobbying has come to the fore in public discourse in the Czech Republic 
in recent years. Current public perception of lobbying is negative however. The 
word is often used as a synonym for corruption, bribery and other unfair political 
practices or infl uences. This is primarily the result of its legal non-recognition. 
Until clear rules of interaction between elected representatives and lobbyists 
representing their constituents are established, the country’s political and 
economic system will face serious problems. These are a lack of trust, confi dence 
and potentially legitimacy. Politicians are split on the issue. Some refuse to 
acknowledge or discuss the practice, whilst others recognize it exists but refuse 
to consider attempts to regulate it. Three policy options exist which would give 
lobbying a fi rmer legal framework within which to operate. A codex framework 
is the most likely to be adopted but there are doubts over the effectiveness of 
such a move. Partial amendments may be the easiest course of action, but 
are arguably the least ambitious choice. The third option is that of passing of 
a law on lobbying. This is the most ambitious policy and is likely to face much 
opposition. Lobbyists and lobbying need to be clearly defi ned. There needs 
to be a communication strategy on lobbying regulation aimed at the general 
public. They need to be convinced that lobbying can be a mutually benefi cial 
proposition for politicians, lobbyists and the general public themselves.
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Executive Summary
This policy study identifi es lobbying as an important public issue in the 
Czech Republic. First, it provides a brief introduction to the topic and shows 
its importance for Czech politics and society. It then recounts how lobbying en-
tered into public discourse and looks at the most prevalent connotations that go 
with the term. The next section describes the views of politicians and those who 
could be called lobbyists with regard to both the activity as well as its possible 
regulation. The key section 4 identifi es available policy options when seeking to 
give the activity a fi rmer legal framework. The policy options examined here are 
a regulation of lobbying through law, ethical codes, and/or via partial amend-
ments made to existing statutes; and each option is outlined in a broader con-
text – looking at what it would entail, its advantages and disadvantages, as well 
as the chances of its success. The following section will formulate four general 
policy recommendations; and these are followed by suggestions for their imple-
mentation. Finally, the study considers communication strategy with regard to 
the issue of lobbying regulation.
1 The Issue
Lobbying has signifi cant implications for public policy-making in the Czech 
Republic. Lobbyists, often under the label of governmental relations fi rms and/
or public relations fi rms, aim their activities both at members of the Parliament 
(legislative lobbying) as well as politicians and political appointees within the 
executive branch of the government (executive lobbying). However, lobby-
ing also infl uences regional and local representatives and, increasingly, deci-
sion-making within political parties too. Finally, with accession to the European 
Union, lobbying fi rms are devoting more and more of their activities to infl uenc-
ing (mostly) Czech representatives within Union structures.
In the Czech Republic, as is the case in other Central European countries, 
the general understanding of what lobbying actually is tends to be broad and 
very imprecise.1 Often, the word lobbying is being used as a synonym for cor-
ruption, bribery and other unfair political practices or infl uences – and this is 
true for politicians, media and sometimes even analysts. The mixture of legal, 
1 Gajdoš, Marek, (2004), ‘Lobbying v Evropské Unii‘ In: Bednář, Luděk, (ed.), Lobbyismus 
versus Korupce. Praha: ISE, 41-60.
CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES / INTERNATIONAL POLICY FELLOWSHIPS 2005/06
5
semi-legal and illegal activities under one label undermines not only the possi-
ble advantages that lobbying might have for public policy-making (i.e. a means 
of conveying preferences made by legitimate interest groups to lawmakers and 
policy-makers; and being a means of infusing a policy debate with previously 
unknown, important facts, information and/or arguments) – it also connects with 
people’s general trust in democratic politics and democratic governance (be-
cause it is seen as serving narrow, special interests and hence being corrupt 
and unjust). And this could have fatal implications for the future development of 
the entire political, social and economic system of the country.
Amid recent political and economic scandals surrounding lobbying and lob-
byists it has become obvious that unless clear rules of interaction between 
elected representatives and lobbyists representing their constituents are estab-
lished, the country’s political and economic system will face serious problems: 
of a lack of trust, confi dence and, potentially, legitimacy. Without these crucial 
elements a liberal democratic system of government will remain unstable – and, 
in the long run, be an untenable ideal. These possibly corrosive effects, espe-
cially in a recently democratized country such as the Czech Republic, make 
the issue of lobbying extremely important for the future of the country and its 
citizens.
2 The Scope of the Issue
For a long time, lobbying had not been recognized as a problematic issue for 
the Czech Republic. This is despite the fact that activities which are nowadays 
conventionally (and without apparently clear meaning) described as lobbying 
have been around since at least the end of Communist rule, in 1989. As a result 
of the lack of recognition of the issue, there is little or no general understand-
ing of how lobbying works and who a lobbyist actually is. A survey from March 
2005 shows that politicians see the lack of information and awareness about 
lobbyists’ activities among the general public as the most problematic aspect of 
the issue.2 This lack of awareness and the ensuing suspicions - coupled with 
a history of corruption, non-transparent policy-making and a structural environ-
ment with the (generally) weak accountability of elected representatives - have 
2 Donath-Burson-Marsteller and Factum Invenio (zpracoval Jiří Šebek), (2005), Průvodce 
účinným lobbováním v ČR [A Guide to successful lobbying in the Czech Republic]. Prague, 3.
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been on the Czech political scene since the beginning of the liberal-democratic 
regime change in 1990.3 
Lobbying fully entered public discourse in 2004, amidst an alleged attempt-
ed bribery scandal involving a Member of Parliament backing the government 
and the leader of the main opposition party (known as the so-called Kořistka 
affair, which has since then been largely forgotten). The MP alleged that he had 
been offered a bribe of 10 million CZK and an ambassadorship in exchange for 
casting a vote of no-confi dence that would lead to the government’s downfall 
during a governmental crisis of the early summer of 2004. It was a well-known 
lobbyist, Jan Večerek, who allegedly made the offer on behalf of the opposi-
tional Civic Democratic Party (ODS). A chief aide to the party chairman was 
allegedly also present at the meeting. 
For an understanding (or lack of it) of lobbying in the Czech Republic, this 
was the defi ning moment. Public offi cials in the above-mentioned survey had 
overwhelmingly agreed with the following assertions that “society perceives lob-
byists as something undesirable” and that “the public expects from its politicians 
that they will reject lobbying attempts.”4 And it was a defi ning moment because, 
up until that point, the notion of lobbying had been practically absent in public 
discourse. With the affair, all of a sudden lobbying appeared on a par with brib-
ery and corruption. But whereas the latter two are clearly defi ned in laws, and 
are recognized as illegal, there was not and still is not any formal recognition 
of lobbying activities. Lobbying provided a label that could be used in public to 
subsume various forms and ways in which public policy was being infl uenced. 
In a way, it refl ected persons’ inability/unwillingness to conduct a more careful 
analysis of interactions between public offi cials and private interests. In conse-
quence, the extent to which lobbying is seen as a form of shorthand for various 
illicit activities, and as being justifi ed, is now open to question.5 Nonetheless, 
the fact remains that public perceptions of lobbying are largely negative - and it 
3 On the 2005 CPI Index of Transparency International the Czech Republic ranks joint 
47-50. There have been no or only small signs of improvement, and the situation is being 
discribed as bad or stagnating. See http://www.transparency.cz/index.php?id=2793. A public 
opinion poll in December 2005 asked about people‘s perception of an improvement/worse-
ning of the situation in various areas of public life. Exactly 70 percent of respondents percei-
ved corruption as “tending to worsen“ or “defi nitely worsening“. This was highest as regards 
amounts for any category. See CVVM Press release, (2006), ‘Hodnocení vývoje v uplynulém 
roce‘ [Judging developments in the past year]. January 9.
4 Donath-Burson-Marsteller and Factum Invenio (zpracoval Jiří Šebek), (2005), Průvodce 
účinným lobbováním v ČR [A Guide to successful lobbying in the Czech Republic]. Prague, 3.
5 See two volumes on lobbing and corruption published by the Institut pro politickou a eko-
nomickou kulturu (IPEK) in Prague. Bednář, Luděk, (ed.), (2004), Lobbyismus versus Korup-
ce. Praha: ISE. Bednář, Luděk, (ed.), (2005), Lobbyismus versus Korupce II. Praha: ISE.
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is unlikely that this will change any time soon, because actors labeled as lobby-
ists have played prominent roles in a handful of additional political ‘affairs’ since 
the summer of 2004. This ‘baggage’ of negative connotations has profound 
implications not only for the future of the democratic governance of the country 
but also for any and all politicians who become connected with the issue. Last, 
but not least, such a negative perception has signifi cant implications for the 
possibility of lobbying’s regulation (see below).    
The negative connotations and stereotypes in relation to lobbying and lob-
byists were reinforced in September 2005 when the so-called Unipetrol scandal 
broke. In a rather unclear case of privatization of the largest Czech oil-process-
ing company, Unipetrol, the Chief of Staff of the Prime Minister allegedly asked 
a Polish lobbyist working on behalf of one of the Czech private bidders for a 
bribe of 5 million CZK. Again, the merits of the case are secondary with regard 
to the present study (N.B. in January 2006, a Parliamentary Investigative Com-
mission voted on party lines that there was no wrong-doing in this process of 
privatization).6 What is important is that the image of lobbying as a deeply prob-
lematic activity was, here, further reinforced. In the most general sense, public 
perceptions of lobbying go hand in hand with the illicit role played by money in 
politics. 
The third dimension that accounts for lobbying’s overly negative perception 
is the direct result of its legal (non-)recognition. Since the Czech Republic’s le-
gal system does not actually recognize anything such as lobbying, the practice 
legally recognized in some other countries (e.g. USA or Canada) as lobbying 
has to be conducted as some other activity for all formal purposes (such as 
invoicing, payments, taxation, etc.); and the activities most often used to “hide” 
lobbying are public relations (PR) campaigns or consultancy. PR’s purpose of 
creating favorable images and perceptions - often through cunning deceit and/
or various strategies of ‘spinning’ the facts – only adds to lobbying’s already 
tarnished image. 
Finally, from a philosophical point of view, lobbying is inherently problematic. 
Even if lobbying were a legally recognized activity that could be understood as 
being free of corruption and bribery, there is an inherent problem with lobbying, 
namely the unfairness that preferential access to politicians and offi cials argu-
ably involves. In other words, those who can “purchase” their way to law-mak-
ers and policy-makers are likely to be listened to more, and public decisions 
6 For an English coverage of the scandal and its connections to lobbying see ‘Secretive lob-
byists still wield infl uence’, (2005). The Prague Post, September 8.
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are going to favour their interests more often than those of other citizens and 
groups. This is a stamp that cannot be removed from the issue, and it can only 
be remedied via publicly available information concerning the interests that are 
likely to be able to secure their voice in both law- and policy-making. If this is not 
the case, the probable results are both inferior outcomes from the law-making 
process and public policy coupled with a perceived lack of legitimacy - as well 
as for that of the political system at large. 
To sum up here, the notion of lobbying entered public discourse in the Czech 
Republic only in the last three years. Because this entry was a result of vari-
ous scandals involving personalities labeled as lobbyists, lobbying is perceived 
among the public as being something overtly negative and bad, often not only 
from a moral perspective but also from a criminal point of view. Moreover, there 
is the inherent problem of unequal access to the public arena. As suggested 
above, all of this has serious implications for the handling of the issue in the po-
litical domain. The views of politicians and lobbyists are the subject of the next 
section – while a more detailed discussion is to be found in the Policy Research 
Study prepared by the author.  
3 Actors’ Views
This section introduces views on the issue by politicians and lobbyists, i.e. 
as the two groups constituting the process of lobbying. There are obviously 
other stakeholders in the issue though - such as non-governmental organiza-
tions, policy advocates, scholars and researchers, journalists and the general 
public; and their views are refl ected in so far as they help us to comprehend the 
issue and see more clearly the possibilities for its more formal regulation within 
the country’s legal framework. 
3.1 Politicians
Based on interviews conducted by the author as well as public declarations 
by relevant actors regarding lobbying, politicians can be put into three groups 
with regard to their views of lobbying. The fi rst group refuses to acknowledge 
or discuss the fact that there is anything such as lobbying – and, therefore, 
that there is any need to deal with it at all. Given the issue’s presence in public 
discourse and the reputation that it has built up in the last two years, though, 
this group is diminishing (or at least when politicians are approached directly 
CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES / INTERNATIONAL POLICY FELLOWSHIPS 2005/06
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regarding the issue). In the face of the public scandals and growing awareness 
that decisions and policies are being infl uenced behind the scenes, a politician 
claiming that the issue of lobbying does not exist would appear to be rather 
simple-minded. It is, however, telling that the survey of public offi cials’ views on 
lobbying conducted in January/February 2005 by the polling company Factum 
Invenio on behalf of public relations/lobbying fi rm Donath-Burston-Marsteller 
- and which was sent to 1669 potential respondents in both houses of Parlia-
ment, Czech Members of the European Parliament, members of the national 
government, and regional and local representatives - got only 362 responses, 
i.e. slightly over 21 percent.7 
A second group does recognize that lobbying exists, and understands it as 
a practice that belongs to the political process. And owing to the negative con-
notations that lobbying has, these politicians think that it should be made more 
transparent. The most prominent representative of this group is the Speaker 
of the House of Deputies, Lubomír Zaorálek (Czech Social-Democratic Party, 
CSSD). When asked directly by the author about how to deal with lobbying and 
about its possible regulation in the Czech Republic, Zaorálek answered that 
he views lobbying as a legitimate practice and that it needs some rules of the 
trade. Zaorálek has been a champion of regulation through an ethical codex of 
the member of the House of Deputies (see next section for a more detailed dis-
cussion) ever since the Kořistka affair, and he introduced a draft of his ethical 
codex in November 2005.8 Several other codexes have been introduced either 
by single politicians or within smaller non-parliamentary parties.  
The third group is made up of politicians who are aware of lobbying and 
dislike the practice intensely. These politicians refuse to consider any attempts 
to regulate lobbying, not because they would deny its existence but because 
they do not want to give it legal recognition (i.e. as being a normal way of doing 
business). In interviews they were not able to formulate a clear line as to what is 
to be done about lobbying. One of the most outspoken members of the Senate, 
Jaroslav Kubera (Civic Democratic Party), maintains that the less the state is 
involved in economic and social matters, the role of lobbyists will be reduced. 
While this ‘libertarian’ approach could curb some of the areas in which lob-
byists are active, it is highly unlikely, in general, to provide a solution to the 
issue. There is always going to be state involvement in the economy - and it is 
7  Donath-Burson-Marsteller and Factum Invenio (zpracoval Jiří Šebek), (2005), Průvodce 
účinným lobbováním v ČR [A Guide to successful lobbying in the Czech Republic]. Prague, vi.
8  Etický kodex poslance Parlamentu České republiky [Ethical codex of the member of the 
Parliament of the Czech Republic].
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the central activity of the state to lay down the rules and enforce them. Yet as 
long as there are rules and public decisions, there will be attempts to infl uence 
them.
3.2 Lobbyists
Lobbyists’ opinions could be divided into two groups. The fi rst one (and 
in the view of many observers, the larger of the two) comprises those who do 
not think that there should be any regulation of lobbying. Lobbying is a legiti-
mate practice, or in the words of Michal Donath, “a legitimate communications 
discipline.”9 Some claim to perceive a collective action problem with regard to 
regulation, asking why should they declare themselves to be lobbyists and lose 
some of their infl uence because they will, as a result, have to “come out”/make 
themselves known - while there will be others who will not register and thus 
take away their clients. These opinions reveal a lot about the nature of lobby-
ing in the Czech Republic. Its negative reputation might become more than 
deserved if formal registration and greater transparency becomes perceived as 
harmful to lobbyists’ activities.
The other group is, at least in theory, open to entertaining the idea of some 
legal regulation, such as registration. However, they do make it clear that they 
want something in return for their consent.10 Most often, lobbyists mentioned 
some special privileges, such as a better access to the Parliament, better or 
easier access to documents, etc. At least one lobbyist said (in a personal dis-
cussion with the author) that regulation would be a good idea because it would 
practically close up the fi eld and protect present lobbyists, or make them even 
stronger. 
Both points need special attention in any consideration of possible policy 
recommendations. Firstly, if lobbyists were to indeed have special privileges, 
the state would be, in practice, giving them a guarantee of that which they are 
selling, namely access to public offi cials. Secondly, the state would be adopt-
ing rules that are favorable to lobbyists, thus automatically giving privileges to 
a specifi c group of citizens.
In the past year, there has also been a talk about lobbyists’ self-regulation. 
Lobbyists and lobbying fi rms would most likely set up a professional organiza-
9 Donath-Burson-Marsteller and Factum Invenio (zpracoval Jiří Šebek), (2005), Průvodce 
účinným lobbováním v ČR [A Guide to successful lobbying in the Czech Republic]. Prague, iv.
10 The President of the House of Deputies, Lubomir Zaoralek, entertained the same idea 
when discussing his own Ethical Codex.
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tion, thus “come out” in this way. The professional organization would create 
its own codex for lobbying and lobbyists, and would oversee that its members 
behaved accordingly. Under this scenario, lobbyists would at least make them-
selves public, though there would be no formal, state-sanctioned regulative 
mechanisms. And several lobbyists have declared this to be “the realistic maxi-
mum” of what can be achieved within the Czech environment at the moment.
4 Policy Options
The present policy study considers three regulative options regarding lobby-
ing. The fi rst option comes via a law on lobbying; a second possibility is through 
various forms of self-regulatory mechanism, both on the side of public offi cials 
and lobbyists. Finally, a third way to deal with lobbying is by proposing partial 
amendments to rules of procedure in the House of Deputies and the Senate. 
4.1 Legal regulation of lobbying 
Inspired largely by the model of lobbying regulation in the United States, 
this would represent the most ambitious way of providing a regulative frame-
work for lobbying in the Czech Republic. The objective of such a law would be 
to create a body of information, most likely through a register of lobbyists with 
the House of Deputies or the Senate, and which would include a list of lobbyists 
and their clients, a list of politicians and public servants being lobbied, issues 
on which lobbying is/was being conducted, etc. This sum of information would 
be publicly available - and could be used by rival political parties and groupings, 
media, non-governmental organizations, the scholarly community, and/or other 
members of the interested public. In this way, it is to be expected that public 
policy would be more transparent, and both lawmakers and members of the 
executive could be made more easily accountable.
When expressed by the author, the idea met up with explicit and strong 
skepticism from many, both in governmental and non-governmental circles, 
with regard to the feasibility of such a model. A typical line of argument was that 
the current, unclear situation benefi ts both public offi cials as well as lobbyists 
- and there is little interest in changing it or establishing clear(er), more open 
rules of the game.
In the light of the above-mentioned opinion poll, this pessimism seems to 
be well justifi ed. While up to 89 percent of respondents held the belief that, in 
12
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their dealings with public offi cials, lobbyists should always make it clear whose 
interests they are representing - and values were roughly the same for such 
areas as ethical behavior (88 percent), respecting the directives of career ser-
vice statutes (85 percent) or for rules pertaining to the transparency of fi nancial 
interests of public offi cials (82 percent) - only 52 percent were of the opinion 
that lobbyists should be registered in a publicly available register.11 Others were 
either against (24 percent) or did not know (24 percent). Public offi cials also 
showed little support for the idea that those persons who enter public institu-
tions with the aim of providing public offi cials with information should be clearly 
distinguished by a card. Only 44 percent of respondents were in favor of such a 
measure, while 38 percent were against, and 18 percent had no opinion. 
Clearly, more of an explanation regarding the idea of registration or other 
forms of legal regulation is needed. The fact that public offi cials expressed a 
disproportionately high lack of opinion regarding two possible regulatory mea-
sures rather than any outright opposition shows that these options could be 
communicated to them. Moreover, the example of Slovakia shows that a legal 
norm regulating lobbying with the express goal of a lobbyists’ register can be 
introduced into a Central European country. In July 2005, a Bill on lobbying 
reached the Slovak Parliament; it was approved on the fi rst reading and sent to 
the committees, where it has, however, stalled – and the recent fall of the gov-
ernment and the extra-ordinary elections scheduled for June 2006 mean that 
this bill will most probably be abandoned. While possible resistance by politi-
cians as well as lobbyists might be the cause of why the bill did not proceed, it 
is equally (if not more) likely that the bill fell victim to obstruction tactics coming 
from the opposition, who were trying to precipitate a new general election and 
overwhelming paralysis for the entire political scene in Slovakia.
Thus, the possibility of introducing and passing a law on lobbying in the 
Czech Republic should in no way be discarded as “unrealistic”. To be sure, the 
process would be diffi cult, and (a) strong sponsor(s) would be required to adopt 
the bill - but it would not be impossible. The need for such a bill is also implicit 
in any attempts to regulate lobbying via an ethical codex (see next subsection 
for details). Additionally, several of my sources in Slovakia confi rmed that it was 
indeed lobbyists themselves who welcomed a “normalization” of their activities 
because, by legalization, lobbying can be distinguished from corruption, and it 
11 Donath-Burson-Marsteller and Factum Invenio (zpracoval Jiří Šebek), (2005), Průvodce 
účinným lobbováním v ČR [A Guide to successful lobbying in the Czech Republic]. Prague, 5.
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would thereby lose some of the negative connotations (that it is the same as 
bribing, corrupting, etc.) that are typically imagined in connection with it. 
The drafters of the Slovak law acknowledged that they had worked with the 
US Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995. They expressed skepticism as to whether 
the law might have any meaningful impact because it is much milder in its re-
quirements than its US ‘inspiration’. The bill’s major weakness is that, unlike in 
the United States, the Slovak law would make the reporting of clients (i.e. on 
whose behalf the lobbying is being done) voluntary. And there is a major worry 
that very few - if any - lobbyists will do this, and hence the goal of improved 
transparency of public policy will not be met. In practical terms, this will mean 
that observers may learn about who is doing the lobbying, though not for whom 
or why. There is also no obligation to report the amount of money that a lobby-
ist is being paid by a client. Lobbyists are required to report the total sum they 
have been paid during one entire year, precluding a more detailed knowledge 
of fi nancial fl ows. Finally, any breach of the law will be punished by a money 
fi ne only.
If the Czech Republic’s politicians opt for a law regulating lobbying, what 
should it look like? The law will need to include the following:
A defi nition of lobbying and a lobbyist
Registration requirements for lobbyists, their administration and publi-
cations
A list of public offi cials who may be lobbied
Responsibilities of public offi cials if being contacted by a lobbyist
The rules of engagement of public offi cials with lobbying fi rms once they 
leave public offi ce
These fi ve areas provide broad focus points and specifi cs, and have been 
investigated in the research study completed by the author. It should be clear 
from the Slovak case, for example, that the mere requirement to register as a 
lobbyist is not suffi cient unless it is accompanied by the duty to report on whose 
behalf a lobbyist is working.
4.2 Ethical codex
Regulation via an ethical codex focuses on public offi ce holders rather than 
on the lobbyists themselves. It is based on the idea of the personal integrity of 
those falling under the prescriptions of a codex and on the assumption that they 
can be held accountable for their actions at the ballot box. At the moment, there 
are two ethical codex proposals. One is an ethical codex for members of the 
•
•
•
•
•
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House of Deputies presented by the social democratic President of the House 
of Deputies, Lubomír Zaorálek;12 the other is an ethical codex from a politician 
introduced by communist senator Vlastimil Balín (Communist Party).13 The lat-
ter does not mention lobbying, so attention is only being given to the former.
The two-page ethical codex for members of the House of Deputies was 
introduced on November 1, 2005. It represents the culmination of activities by 
the House President Zaorálek (which were set into motion by the Kořistka affair 
in summer of 2004). To a large extent, the codex is inspired by similar docu-
ments in the European Union, Great Britain and the United States. It formulates 
several norms of proper conduct as well as prescriptions concerning public ac-
cess to information related to the exercise of one’s mandate, the employment 
of relatives, or gift receiving. Regarding lobbying, article 5 states that
On the grounds of the House of Deputies, the Member of the Parliament 
of the Czech Republic is bound to meet only with representatives of 
those lobbying and other interest groups who have previously registered 
themselves according to the internal rules of the House.14
Signing the codex will be voluntary, though the Social Democratic Party has 
already made it known that all of its candidates for the House of Deputies in 
2006 elections will be required to sign the codex. The draft of the codex does 
not specify how lobbyists will be registered or what the subject of registration 
would be; this is to be determined by a future internal directive of the House of 
Deputies. 
Immediately after Zaorálek unveiled his draft of the ethical codex, opposi-
tion politicians rebuffed the initiative. They claimed that Zaorálek, personally, 
was not credible enough a politician to propose such an initiative. A few days 
before, Zaorálek was accused in the media of misusing a military helicopter for 
personal travel to his home district and of illegally employing an assistant. None 
of the accusations proved convincing, and they were only short-lived. However, 
a lobbyist asked by the author about the idea of the ethical codex about two 
weeks after its introduction provided an answer very similar to that of the op-
position politicians’, saying that he “wouldn’t mind a possible regulation through 
a codex, but the person that proposed it is not trustworthy.”15 
12 The full text of the codex was published, for example, by a leading daily Dnes on Novem-
ber 1, 2005.
13 The text of the codex can be accessed at www.balin.cz/literatura.php (October 10, 2005.)
14 The Codex of the Member of the House of Deputies, Article 5. 
15 This was a peculiar line of argument both for the opposition as well as the lobbyist. It did 
not engage any of the ideas within the codex. 
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The proposal elicited little public debate. Zaorálek backtracked on the draft, 
announcing further consultations with other political parties, and at the time of 
writing this study, the codex, as it was presented, is practically a dead-letter 
document. Besides the political reactions, there were merely rather low-profi le 
commentaries in the newspapers. However, some substance could still be de-
rived from the political exchange; there was a criticism and, subsequently, an 
agreement that any ethical codex should apply not just to lawmakers but also to 
a broader spectrum of public offi cials. A senior member of the oppositional Civic 
Democratic Party, Petr Nečas, while denouncing Zaorálek, said that it might be 
a better idea to deal with some of the issues included in the codex through legal 
action. Finally, and specifi cally with regard to lobbying, several participants in 
the debate noted that since there is no legally recognized defi nition of lobbying, 
it is not clear who should have the obligation to register with the House under 
Article 5 of the codex.
While those skeptical about the legal regulation of lobbying in the Czech 
Republic view the codex framework as much more likely to be adopted than any 
specifi c law (not least because it will concern only politicians, and not lobby-
ists), there are some grounds for caution as to exactly how much such a codex 
would serve as an effective means of formalizing lobbying contacts, thereby 
putting them under public scrutiny. First, the tradition and practice of investiga-
tive journalism that would uncover ethical lapses of politicians is and remains 
weak in the Czech Republic. Second, the necessary condition that a particular 
politician can be held accountable at the ballot box (and voted out of the offi ce) 
is absent owing to the proportional election system for the Czech House of 
Deputies. Third, political parties have shown little resolve when it comes to forc-
ing their members to behave ethically – or in pacifying/punishing them if they do 
not. Especially for these reasons, the codex cannot be and is not viewed as a 
panacea. Rather, its proponents understand it as a sort of defi ned benchmark 
against which the behavior and activities of public offi cials might be contrasted 
and scrutinized.
So some reasons do exist for supporting the document if it is to cover con-
tacts between public offi cials and lobbyists. Firstly, in its present form it foresees 
some registration procedure for lobbyists - which will have to be further devel-
oped. Although it is likely that any procedure will resemble more the Slovak bill 
than the US or Canadian law, this is by no means a foregone conclusion. Sec-
ondly, the codex creates and reinforces a discursive structure connecting lob-
bying and ethical issues. Thirdly, it provides at least something for those trying 
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to hold politicians accountable. Fourthly, the existence of an ethical codex does 
not undermine other modes of legally regulating lobbying. In fact, as witnessed 
in the debate about Zaorálek’s ethical codex, it makes the need for a law deal-
ing with lobbying more obvious.
4.3 Partial amendments 
Unlike a law on lobbying or an ethical codex, which both represent a more 
or less comprehensive approach to lobbying regulations, partial amendments 
aim at minor steps that would lead to greater transparency of relations be-
tween public offi cials and lobbyists. Undoubtedly, this is the least ambitious of 
the three possibilities, yet it might tackle some of the most problematic areas 
involving public offi cials and lobbyists. The approach offers a range of various 
smaller goals, which are derived from the processes via which lobbyists actu-
ally infl uence public decision-making. As a result of greater transparency and 
accountability, public trust in law- and policy-making could be increased. At the 
same time, it might be easier to ensure the passage and implementation of 
some partial amendments in comparison with a law on lobbying or a codex. The 
incremental approach connects up with signifi cant hopes, especially in non-
governmental circles. A possible drawback is that time and again there would 
have to be a new round of activism and advocacy surrounding these smaller 
measures, thereby making the option arguably quite demanding in terms of 
time and resources. 
Suggestions proposed by those I interviewed range from changes to the 
rules of the proceedings of the House of Deputies and the Senate (especially 
when introducing amendments to bills that are being passed), making publicly 
available the list of participants in public hearings and sittings of the House and 
Senate committees, and the public availability of minutes of meetings of mem-
bers of legislation and executive. The range of options here is wide - and the list 
of possibilities could be expanded based on the experiences of other countries. 
Here is a brief consideration of the three options mentioned above. 
One of the most notorious ways in which lobbyists infl uence the legislative 
process is to have individual lawmakers introduce amendments to bills that 
clear the fi rst reading in the House of Deputies. The same applies also to the 
Senate, though to a lesser degree, as any legislation or its amendments passed 
there have to be subsequently approved of by the House of Deputies. Thus, 
individual lawmakers are able to “smuggle in” amendments that did not have 
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to go through the House Committees. It is not unusual that these amendments 
have little or nothing to do with the actual bill to which they are attached. While 
the practice cannot be abolished, since it is the role of lawmakers to make the 
laws, the rules of procedure concerning amendments could be changed so that 
an amendment would, for example, have to be proposed by a group of several 
lawmakers or by a party faction.
Much of the work of the Parliament is done in its Committees. Their sittings 
are open to the public unless otherwise decided, and it is not unusual that lob-
byists visit them. There is a number of stories circulating around the Parliament 
that during Committee debates on particular bills there were so many lobbyists 
attending that they could not fi t into the room, prompting a Committee chairman 
to threaten to close the meeting to the public. With the consent of the Commit-
tee, its chairman can even allow other persons (i.e. non-members) to speak 
during the sitting. All visitors are required to sign in when entering the sitting. 
So a step that could give the general public a better idea of the environment 
surrounding the passage of laws would be the public availability of the lists of 
visitors at Committee sittings – and since lists of those present are compiled 
anyway, this would only mean posting them up on the Committees’ websites. 
The idea that MPs and Senators, but also other public offi cials, keep a 
publicly available diary of the minutes of meetings and the visitors that they 
receive has also got some attention. Again, this would make the inputs that go 
into public decision-making more transparent. The contentious issue has been 
whether to keep track of all meetings or just meetings taking part within the 
Parliament and its offi ces - with the latter opening a potentially large loophole. 
The requirement would again depend on the integrity of public offi cials. Some 
of the offi cials and lobbyists that the author talked to about this were rather 
skeptical about the measure, arguing that this would mean a greater, and also 
unnecessary, burden for public offi cials, while hardly improving public policy at 
all. Whether such skepticism is warranted is questionable. There is no doubt 
that public offi cials do have meetings with representatives of various interest 
groups, and reporting these meetings would not require too much work from 
their staff. With regard to MPs and Senators, results could be posted on a 
monthly basis on the Parliament’s websites. The situation is more complicated 
vis-ŕ-vis other public offi cials, both in terms of reporting procedure as well as the 
scope of those obliged to report. And this step would seem to be better suited to 
dealing with legislative lobbying rather than executive lobbying. 
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5 Policy Recommendations
The previous section outlined possible policy options regarding the regula-
tion of lobbying in the Czech Republic. There are specifi c policy recommenda-
tions for each policy option discussed above, although a handful of general 
recommendations can be made, too. 
5.1 Recommendation 1: Lobbying and lobbyists should be clearly 
defi ned
In spite of the skepticism of political advocates of transparent and account-
able policy-making as well as actors from the NGO sector about the prospects 
of introducing anything resembling at least Slovakia’s bill on lobbying, the need 
for a legal defi nition of lobbying is becoming ever more obvious. This does not 
have to be necessarily done via a law, though a legal defi nition would be pref-
erable. Since the Ethical Codex of a lawmaker does foresee some registration 
requirement (as yet undetermined in its form and content) it could then provide 
its own defi nition. Such a defi nition could eventually become widely accepted 
and form a basis for a future defi nition within the law on lobbying, provided that 
such a law is passed.
5.2 Recommendation 2: The range of public offi cials who can be 
lobbied needs to be defi ned 
Lobbyists attempt to infl uence a much broader spectrum of public offi cials 
than just lawmakers. Two lobbyists for a large transnational technology and 
communications company said that, rather than engaging themselves in leg-
islative lobbying, they spend most of their time trying to ensure that public ten-
ders announced by ministries and other parts of the executive are fair in their 
conditions. On the other hand, several politicians currently at the national level 
noted that they fi rst made contacts with lobbyists when working at a local and/
or regional level. These contacts were a product of representatives’ efforts to 
secure various state and EU subsidies for their regions and/or municipalities. 
A law on lobbying would thus be better suited to covering the broader range of 
public offi cials compared to an ethical codex.
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5.3 Recommendation 3: Lobbyists should not get special privileges
Several lobbyists expressed the idea that they would accept the registra-
tion requirement (without further specifi cation with regard to what would be 
reported by them) if they were granted some privileges upon registering - such 
as easier access to public buildings, the availability of draft documents, etc. Yet 
even if hypothetical registration requirements proved to be more stringent than 
in the Slovak bill, lobbyists should not have any rights that are not possessed 
by all other citizens. Precisely because it is possible to recognize lobbying as 
legitimate practice - where lobbyists sell their contacts and knowledge of public 
decision- and policy-making - the state should not grant them any special ben-
efi ts for their activities. Thus, a law on lobbying or any other form of regulation 
should not establish any special privileges.
5.4 Recommendation 4: Guidelines for lobbied public offi cials 
should be established
Lobbyists approach many public offi cials, i.e. persons other than lawmak-
ers. Even if there is no law, a set of clear guidelines for public offi cials contacted 
by a lobbyist should be established. Such guidelines should make it clear that 
disclosure or provision of information that would be advantageous to lobbyists, 
accepting gifts from them, helping them secure specifi c objectives, etc. is pro-
hibited. One foreseeable problem with this recommendation is the lack of defi -
nition of who a lobbyist actually is. In the absence of such a defi nition, though, 
these guidelines could be worked out so that they are more generalized, cov-
ering a wider range of meetings. To begin with, the Parliament could delineate 
guidelines for lawmakers as a part of, or alongside, its ethical codex.
6 Policy Implementation
The decisions to be made between various policy options will to a large 
degree dictate the way(s) of their implementation. A law on lobbying would re-
quire more precise implementation measures as regards the registration and 
control of information provided by lobbyists. There does not seem to be a need 
for a special agency to deal with such things. Rather, lobbyists could fi le their 
registration papers, as in the United States or Canada, with the offi ce of the 
Chancellor of the House and Senate. This could apply to both legislative as 
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well as executive lobbying. Registration should be made simple and provided 
registration information will need to be publicly available. Since the number of 
lobbyists and lobbying fi rms is in the low-hundreds at most, this would not seem 
to present an excessive burden on the respective offi ces. 
 No law on lobbying will be passed before the general elections sched-
uled for June 2006. The already existing, even if disputed, ethical codex re-
mains at the moment the best option for providing at least some framework as 
regards legislative lobbying. As noted, it does foresee some sort of registration 
procedure. Thus, even though the codex is (and is likely remain) a voluntary 
document, eventually a registration procedure will have to be established by 
the legislature if the codex is to have any meaning at all. The critical questions 
are the scope of registration requirements (i.e. does one merely declare him-
self/herself a lobbyist, or will additional information regarding issues, clients, 
etc. be also disclosed), the public availability of information gathered and, last 
but not least, compliance - as it will have to be the lawmakers themselves who 
will have to make sure that they meet only with registered lobbyists. On the 
other hand, there could be a positive spillover too, as information about lobby-
ists would also be available to those lawmakers who do not sign on to the codex 
as well as to journalists and the general public.
As for the partial amendments, some of them could be applied almost im-
mediately, and with little or no diffi culty. Lists of visitors to Committee meetings 
are drawn up anyway, and there seems to be no reason why they should not be 
made public as part of or an appendix to regular reports from such Committee 
meetings (which are already publicly available on the Committees’ websites). 
Public availability of the minutes of meetings could be made part of the ethical 
codex, too. Changing the rules by which amendments to bills are introduced 
would be the most diffi cult thing to achieve, as this would entail a change in the 
current law regulating the rules of proceedings in Parliament.
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7 Communication Analysis
Parts 1 and 2 of this policy study have shown that lobbying carries an overt-
ly negative connotation in public discourse within the Czech Republic – and this 
would seem to call for the following:
1) The issue of regulation has to be advanced so that it is not dismissed as a 
form of advocacy of “special interests” or “criminal” lobbying. One way to do this 
could be by spurring greater public debate that could discuss both the pros and 
cons of lobbying and lobbyists. While the decision on what to do with lobbying 
will ultimately have to be political, the issue will provide enough ground for such 
a debate.
At the same time, there is a strong general feeling against any state regu-
lation. Thus, the issue is a double-edged sword, where the proponents of any 
legal framework will have to contend that a framework can serve to benefi t 
public policy-making whilst not creating additional costs for both the state and 
lobbyists.
2) There needs to be the devising of a strategy to convince the public that 
something can indeed be done about the issue of lobbying. The example of 
other countries where laws on lobbying have been passed shows us that this 
does not happen unless there is a strong feeling that something needs to be 
done. Such a realization usually comes amidst or after scandals involving 
lobbyists.
In the Czech Republic, lobbying has become a part of public discourse as a 
result of numerous scandals. Public opinion polls continually indicate that cor-
ruption, favoritism and the roles played by special interests are perceived as 
being the most troublesome public issues. Again, politicians will have to set the 
laws and rules to deal with such problems. The role of non-governmental ad-
vocates and initiatives is to help suggest ways of moving ahead, showing that 
there are tools to cope with issues such as lobbying. 
Lobbying will remain a part of public policy-making – and there are inherent 
problems connected with preferential access being given to specifi c interests. 
However, the regulation of lobbying can be framed as a mutually benefi cial 
proposition for all sides - politicians, lobbyists and the general public.
